

A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Land Use in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire Under Contractual Relationships

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The tax-farming contracts were generally short-term arrangements between the state and its elites. Even though the historical background of these contracts has generated a substantial body of research, the question of why these contracts failed in the long term has been overlooked. While the majority of the debate focuses on the high auction prices, the long-term value of these contracts actually declines. External shocks, on the other hand, are said to have diminished the efficiency of these short-term contracts. Specific explanations for why the system failed have appeared, implying that these shocks generate internal shocks such as state seizures. The literature has mostly ignored the overexploitation of land within contracts. The primary objective of this research is to examine at the problem of overexploitation on financial resources. This study analyses contracts and associated conflicts to attain this purpose. The game-theoretical perspective presented in this paper will be supported by particular instances based on primary sources.